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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sheldon Don Stone appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of conspiracy, battery with intent to commit a serious 
felony (robbery), and robbery claiming the state failed to present any evidence 
corroborating the accomplice testimony against him. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinas 
The state charged Stone with criminal conspiracy, battery with intent to 
commit a serious felony (robbery), and robbery (R., pp.22-24), after he conspired 
with Dustin Bailey, Tyler Wall, and Jeremy Sanderson to beat and rob 
Sanderson's former landlord, Douglas Griffith, because Douglas would not return 
Sanderson's $150.00 deposit. (Tr., p.76, L.2 - p.77, L.19, p.143, L . l  - p.158, 
L.22.) Stone pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, after which a jury convicted 
him of all counts alleged in the Information. (Tr., p.431, L.7 - p.432, L.13; R., 
pp.174-75.) 
Stone filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, contending "there was no 
basis by which the jury could reach a guilty verdict" because, he contended, 
"[tjhe only evidence linking [Stone] to the crime was the testimony of the 
accomplice, Jeremy Sanderson." (R., pp.179-80.) The court denied the motion. 
(R., pp.219-31.) Stone also filed a motion for mistrial, which the court denied. 
(R., pp.181-82, 219-31.) 
The court imposed concurrent unified twelve-year sentences with three 
years fixed on all three counts, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.184-89.) At the 
conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court suspended Stone's 
sentences and placed him on probation. (R., pp.197-204.) Stone appealed. (R., 
pp.233-35.) 
ISSUE 
Stone states the issue on appeal as: 
Can Mr. Stone's convictions stand where the accomplice testimony 
upon which they are based was not corroborated by any other 
evidence tending to connect Mr. Stone to the charged offenses? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Was there substantial, competent evidence presented at trial, including 
corroborating evidence, from which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Stone was guilty of conspiracy, battery with intent to commit a serious felony 
(robbery), and robbery? 
ARGUMENT 
There Was Substantial, Competent Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The 
Jurv Found Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Stone Was Guilty Of Conspiracy, 
Batterv With Intent To Commit A Serious Felony (Robberv), And Robbery 
A. Introduction 
Stone challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's 
verdicts finding him guilty of conspiracy, battery with intent to commit a serious 
felony (robbery), and robbery, claiming he was convicted "based solely on the 
testimony of an alleged accomplice," without any corroboration of that testimony. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) A review of the record shows, however, that the 
state presented substantial, competent evidence, including corroboration of 
Sanderson's testimony, from which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Stone was guilty of each alleged offense. Stone has failed to show any 
basis for reversal of his convictions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007); State v. 
Reveg, 121 ldaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 ldaho 
759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the 
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. Qliver, 144 ldaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 387; State 
v. Knutson, 121 ldaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); m, 112 ldaho at 
761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from 
those facts are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. m, 144 
ldaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 387; m, 112 ldaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072 
C. The State Presented Substantial. Competent Evidence At Trial, Including 
Corroboration Of Sanderson's Testimony From Which The Jury Found 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Stone Was Guiltv Of Conspiracy, 
Batterv With lntent To Commit A Serious Felonv (Robbery), And Robbery 
Count I of the lnformation alleged "Sheldon D. Stone, on or about July 1, 
2006, in Bingham County, Idaho, did combine or conspire with another, to-wit: 
Dustin Bailey and/or Tyler Wall and/or Jeremy Sanderson to commit the crime(s) 
of Robbery andlor Battery With the lntent to Commit a Serious Felony." Count I 
further alleged certain overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
including: "On or about July 1, 2006; Dustin Bailey andlor Tyler Wall andlor 
Sheldon Don Stone traveled by car to the Carol Street Apartments to meet with 
Doug Griffith, manager of the Carol Street Apartments." (R., p.23.) Counts II 
and Ill of the lnformation alleged: 
COUNT 2: Sheldon Don Stone, on or about July 1, 2006, in 
Bingham County, Idaho, aided and abetted Dustin Bailey and Tyler 
Wall in the commission of the offense of Battery With the lntent to 
Commit a Serious Felony, by driving Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall to 
the Carol Street Apartments for the purpose of committing the 
crime of Battery with the lntent to Commit a Serious Felony, took 
the car to a location where it would not be seen by Doug Griffith, 
and after Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall had committed the offense, 
drove Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall away from the location of the 
Carol Street Apartments. 
COUNT 3: Sheldon Don Stone, on or about July 1, 2006, in 
Bingham County, Idaho, aided and abetted Dustin Bailey and Tyler 
Wall in the commission of the offense of Robbery, by driving Dustin 
Bailey and Tyler Wall to the Carol Street Apartments for the 
purpose of committing the crime of Robbery, took the car to a 
location where it would not be seen by Doug Griffith, and after 
Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall had committed the offense, drove 
Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall away from the location of the Carol 
Street Apartments. 
(R., pp.23-24 (emphasis in original).) 
Consistent with the allegations in the Information, Sanderson testified at 
trial that he called Bailey and "asked him to come to Blackfoot and beat up [his] 
landlord." (Tr., p.143, L . l  - p.144, L.7.) Bailey agreed and drove to Blackfoot 
later that day with Wall and Stone. (Tr., p.145, L.13 - p.146, L.13, p.262, L. 14 - 
p.263, L.16.) After they arrived, Sanderson told Bailey where the apartments 
were located and advised him to park in the parking lot behind the apartments, 
"so they couldn't be seen." (Tr., p.148, Ls.8-12, p.149, Ls.14-21.) Sanderson 
also told Bailey that if Douglas had "any money, to take it." (Tr., p.152, Ls.16- 
23.) 
Wall was present during the conversation as was Stone. (Tr., p.148, L.17 
- p.149, L.lO.) Although Stone was approximately ten feet away sitting on the 
porch and did not participate in the conversation, Sanderson testified Stone was 
paying attention to the conversation. (Tr., p.151, L.18 - p.152, L.lO.) 
After receiving direction from Sanderson, Bailey called Douglas, gave him 
a fake name, and told him he was interested in renting an apartment. (Tr., p.149, 
L.22 - p.150, L.23, p.268, L.11 - p.269, L.15.) Douglas and Bailey arranged to 
meet at the apartments. (Tr., p.268, L . l l  - p.269, L.15.) After Bailey arranged a 
meeting time, Bailey told Stone to drive, and Bailey, Stone, and Wall left. (Tr., 
p.151, Ls.10-13, p.152, L.24-p.153, L.14.) 
When Douglas arrived at the apartments, he saw Bailey and Wall, but did 
not see their car as they had parked according to Sanderson's instructions. (Tr., 
p.84, L.13-p.85, L.9, p.157, Ls.22-24, p.269, Ls.16-17, p.299, Ls.12-25.) While 
Douglas was showing Bailey and Wall around the apartment, he was suddenly 
"blind-sided" by a punch to his left ear. (Tr., p.90, L.8 - p.92, L.8, p.332, Ls.15- 
17.) Bailey and Wall then began "hitting," "kicking," and "kneeing" Douglas. (Tr., 
p.92, Ls.11-16.) One of them then said, "Give us your wallet," and reached into 
Douglas's pocket and took approximately $1200.00 cash from Douglas's pocket 
- rent money Douglas had collected earlier that day from other tenants. (Tr., p., 
Ls.2-19, p.95, Ls.4-21.) 
Bailey and Wall left the apartment, got back in the car with Stone, and 
returned to Sanderson's house. (See Tr., p.284, Ls.11-24, p.300, Ls.4-7.) 
Sanderson testified that when they returned, Stone was still driving. (Tr., p.158, 
Ls.19-22.) Once back at Sanderson's house, Sanderson said Bailey, Wall, and 
Stone were "excited" and "hyped up." (Tr., p.154, Ls.6-25.) Bailey told 
Sanderson "everything that happened, then pulled out $1,200," which he split up 
amongst the four of them. (Tr., p.156, Ls.10-14.) Sanderson testified he 
"believe[d] [he] got five hundred, and everybody else got, I think, two," including 
Stone. (Tr.,p.156,L.17-p.I57,L.l.) 
On appeal, and in his motion for judgment of acquittal, Stone argues that 
Sanderson's testimony is insufficient to sustain his convictions because 
Sanderson was an accomplice' and, as such, his testimony required 
corroboration, but the state offered none. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16; R., 
pp.179-80.) While Stone is correct in his assertion that ldaho law requires 
corroboration of accomplice testimony, he is incorrect in his conclusion that such 
corroboration did not exist in this case 
ldaho Code § 19-21 17 states: 
Testimony of accomplice - Corroboration. - A conviction cannot 
be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is 
corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid 
of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant 
with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not 
sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the 
circumstances thereof. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
"This statutory corroboration requirement is intended to protect against the 
danger that an accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony, incriminating an 
innocent defendant in order to win more favorable treatment for the accomplice." 
Matthews v. State, 136 ldaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001). The 
corroborating evidence required by I.C. § 19-2117 does not, however, "need to 
be sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every 
detail of the accomplice's testimony." State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, -, 195 
P.3d 737, 742 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). Rather, the corroborating 
evidence may be "slight," and "need only go to one material fact." Id. Moreover, 
the corroborating evidence "may be entirely circumstantial." & "Statements 
' The jury was instructed: "Dustin bailey, Tyler Wall and Jeremy Sanderson are 
accomplices." (R., p.147 (Instruction No. 22).) 
attributed to the defendant himself may serve as the necessary corroboration." 
Id., 146 Idaho a t ,  - 195 P.3d at 741-42. 
Stone claims there is insufficient evidence to affirm his convictions 
because, he contends, "there is no evidence, independent of Mr. Sanderson's 
testimony, tending to connect Mr. Stone to the alleged offenses against Mr. 
Griffith." (Appellant's Brief, p.14 (emphasis in original).) To the contrary, there 
was testimony from Detective Rocky Cronquist, as well as, testimony offered by 
Stone that corroborated Sanderson's testimony and "tendiedl to connect [Stone] 
with the commission of the offense." 
Detective Cronquist testified that he interviewed Stone about the crimes in 
December 2006. (Tr., p.246, Ls.3-16.) Detective Cronquist "explained" to Stone 
that he "needed to talk to him in regards to an incident that occurred" in Blackfoot 
and, although Detective Cronquist never mentioned any names, Stone "indicated 
that the only thing he was aware of is what he had seen on the news regarding 
Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall." (Tr., p.247, L.22 - p.248, L.2.) Stone also originally 
denied being in Blackfoot at the time. (Tr., p.248, Ls.24-25.) However, Stone 
later admitted he was in Blackfoot when the crimes occurred. (Tr., p.252, Ls.16- 
18.) In addition, when Detective Cronquist told Stone "he could probably have 
the same deal as the individual that was cooperating," Stone's response was 
"that all he knew was that it was -- a guy owed somebody some money, and 
that's what the whole thing was all about." (Tr., p.249, Ls.12-14.) Stone's 
detailed knowledge of the crime five months after it occurred,' including the 
names of two of the individuals involved, and his eventual admission that he was 
in Blackfoot on the day of the crimes "tends to connect [him] with the commission 
of the offense[sj" independent of Sanderson's testimony as required by I.C. § 19- 
21 17. 
In addition, although both Bailey and Wall denied that Stone participated 
in or had any knowledge of the actual crimes, both testified that he was with them 
on that day and drove to the apartments and waited in the car.3 (See generally 
Tr., pp.259-310.) While Bailey and Wall were undoubtedly accomplices, their 
testimony regarding Stone's presence should be considered as corroborative 
evidence because they were called on Stone's behalf at trial. Consequently, 
there is no reason to discount their testimony in order "to protect against the 
danger" that it was fabricated to incriminate Stone "in order to win more favorable 
treatment for" either Bailey or Wall. Matthews, 136 Idaho at 49, 28 P.3d at 390. 
Quite the contrary, their testimony was offered by Stone for the sole purpose of 
helping him. As such, it is properly considered as corroborative, and supports 
Stone characterizes the news coverage as "widespread," complains that the 
district court "assumed that the only media coverage of the case . . . occurred 
around the time of the commission of the alleged offenses," and argues "any 
factual finding to that effect would be clearly erroneous, as there is no evidence 
in the record to support such a finding." (Appellant's Brief, p.15 and 17.7.) 
Contrary to Stone's assertions, the evidence in the record regarding the news 
coverage of the crimes is not that it was "widespread," but that Detective 
Cronquist agreed with defense counsel that "it was all over the news," by which 
he meant he saw "it in the morning newspaper . . . in Blackfoot." (Tr., p.251, 
Ls.16-21.) Stone lives in Pocatello (Tr., p.251, L.24 - p.252, L.l); there was no 
evidence regarding the quantity of news coverage of the crimes, if any, in 
Pocatello. 
Stone also admitted as much to the presentence investigator. (PSI, p.3.) 
Sanderson's testimony that Stone was involved in the commission of the 
offenses. See People v. Fuqua, 222 Cal.App.2d 306, 312, 35 Cal.Rptr. 163, 166 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (rejecting Fuqua's claim that the trial court erred in 
ailing to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony ought to be viewed with 
distrust since the "three codefendants were not witnesses for the prosecution but 
testified solely on their own behalf, and their testimony tended to corroborate 
[Fuqua's] version"). 
Because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts, 
including evidence which corroborated Sanderson's testimony, Stone has failed 
to establish error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Stone's convictions. 
DATED this 3oth day of March 2009. 
J&~SICA M. LORELLO 
~ e p u t ~  Attorney General 
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